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	 Between August of 1995 and July of 1996, Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives Newt Gingrich published two books. One, To	Renew	America,	a 
folksy Republican polemic cobbled together from Gingrich’s speeches, served as 
a sequel to Contract	with	America,	the blueprint of the conservative movement 
that assumed control of Congress in 1995.1 The other was 1945, coauthored with 
William R. Forstchen, a novel set in an alternate universe.2 In 1945’s divergent 
timeline, Germany does not declare war on the United States, the Soviet Union is 
split into fragments, and the United States and Germany have settled into a cold 
war. Nazi soldiers parachute into the United States to a capture a nuclear facility 
in Tennessee, but posses of arms-bearing American veterans successfully defend 
their country. 1945	was representative of the flourishing genre of alternate history 
novels in all but two ways: an author’s celebrity and its media exposure. Due 
to Gingrich’s status as the public leader of the conservative renaissance of the 
mid-1990s, 1945 was widely reviewed in mainstream publications. Treated as a 
curiosity and ridiculed for its poor literary quality, very few reviewers noted the 
libertarian themes in 1945, and even fewer placed it in the context of an inchoate 
literary genre.3 
 1995 can be considered the birth year of the alternate history novel as a	genre. 
As a conceptual category, the counterfactual, as historians term their what-if	
narratives, has been pursued in print since classical Greece, if not earlier. (In a 
broad sense, anyone who has wondered “what if?” could be said to be an alternate 
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historian.) In the twentieth century, alternate histories and counterfactuals, also 
known as “allohistories,” have been published by fiction writers and maverick 
historians around the world. As Gavriel Rosenfeld discusses in his encyclopedic 
chronicle of Nazi-related alternate history culture, the production of allohistorical 
cartoons, films, and stories increased sharply in the wake of the Holocaust, which 
continues to provide subject matter for alternate historians.4 While hundreds of 
texts can be retroactively added to the list of alternate histories, the version of 
the literary counterfactual that rose to prominence in the early 1990s was not 
fully recognized as a genre until science-fiction reviewers Steven H. Silver and 
Evelyn Leeper and NASA scientist Robert B. Schmunk established the Sidewise 
Awards for Alternate History in 1995.5 The Sidewise Award defined the alternate 
history as a literary category and became a mechanism to draw and police the 
borders of the genre. Each year a panel of judges, ranging from three to eight in 
number, awards a Sidewise to one novel and one short story and lists the runners 
up.6 The authority and aesthetic judgments of the Sidewise Award panel seem to 
be unchallenged among publishers (on book jackets), authors, and fans around 
the Internet.7 Unlike awards for mainstream literary genres, such as the Pulitzer 
Prizes and National Book Awards, the Sidewise Awards seems to recognize 
both a combination of literary excellence and popularity, as demonstrated by 
the proportional representation of popular and prolific alternate history writers 
such as Harry Turtledove in the winner’s circle.
 In this paper, I consider the contemporary alternate history genre in three 
parts. First, I account for the birth of the genre, which I connect to developments 
in book publishing and the end of the Cold War. Second, I identify common 
generic formal and structural aspects and analyze the content of a number of 
representative alternate history novels, which feature a libertarian combination of 
antistatism and militarism. Finally, I situate these increasingly popular books in 
their historical and political context and argue that they can be viewed not only 
as a marginal genre of popular fiction but also as a bellwether of mainstream 
American politics.
 In many ways, this is exploration of uncharted territory. Both alternate 
historians and the few academics who have studied the phenomenon have at-
tempted to ground the nascent genre by searching their libraries for similar texts, 
thereby creating a retroactive catalog of alternate history novels.8 While Livius’ 
Ab	urbe	condita	and Benjamin Disraeli’s Alroy	may share the (few) formal char-
acteristics of contemporary alternate history novels, their inclusion in a master 
bibliography of alternate histories obscures the particular character of the genre 
that has recently emerged.9 When the generic formula of this popular formation 
is diluted by the addition of such diverse counterfactuals, its significance in its 
proper historical context is hidden. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson put it, “the critic who classifies a rhetorical artifact as generically 
akin to a class of similar artifacts has identified an undercurrent of history rather 
than comprehended an act isolated in time.”10 Since the early 1990s, hundreds of 
novels have attempted to re-imagine the past in various ways, and have engaged 
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millions of fans—many of whom have become lay alternate historians of their 
own.11 How can we account for the contemporary explosion of alternate history 
as a literary genre? How is history being re-written, in what way, by whom, and 
why now? Before developing my own hypotheses, it will be necessary to further 
define the alternate history novel. 
 Some scholars have considered the alternate history to be a subgenre 
within science fiction, but this is misleading, since it can also take the form of 
a traditional novel or a work of fantasy. Although this article is concerned with 
literary counterfactuals, a number of films and television shows have engaged 
in counterfactual history, and one can argue that the increasingly popular video 
games with historical settings that allow for allohistorical developments should be 
placed in the same category. 12 Despite the concept’s flexibility there are important 
distinctions to be made. In his dissertation on the alternate history (which he calls 
“uchronia”13), William Joseph Collins makes the useful distinction between “pure 
uchronia,” an alternate history in the form of a fictional work; “plural uchronia,” 
alternate worlds that co-exist in literature; “infinite presents,” a limitless amount 
of simultaneous distinct universes14; and the popular “time-travel alteration,” 
where travel into the past creates a different present.15 My primary focus here is 
with the “pure uchronia,” or, what Karen Hellekson has called the “true alternate 
history,” which is often identified by its opposition to fantasy.16 While “true al-
ternate histories” set in the distant past can lead to fantastic results—such as the 
evolution of intelligent dinosaurs in Brian Aldiss’ The	Malacia	Tapestry—the 
goal of this genre is to create a universe that could plausibly	exist today.17 No 
dragons or asteroids allowed. The alternate history is primarily an American 
phenomenon; almost two thirds of Sidewise winners or runners-up are American, 
and the most popular topics deal with themes directly relevant to U.S. history, 
often in an intentionally nationalistic manner. Judging from their web presence, 
the vast majority of alternate history fans are Americans.18 As a result, I examine 
the alternate history in the context of American politics and culture.
 How can we explain the rise of the alternate history genre in the mid-1990s? 
Before introducing my own theory I will evaluate some of the most popular 
explanations provided by journalists and critics. 
The Nuts and Bolts of the Genre Machine
 In the early 1990s, the alternate history grew from a marginal category to a 
mainstream genre in the United States. Publishing industry statistics that would 
accurately measure the growth of the genre are not available, but a number of 
qualitative extrapolations can serve as approximations. A major sign is the critical 
attention the genre has received. By the turn of the millennium many national 
newspapers and magazines had published at least one article about the alternate 
history, most of them focusing on its very popularity.19 Academics have taken 
note: two books have been published and five dissertations completed in the last 
fifteen years.20 Another sign is the creation of an official publishing category; 
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while most publishers continue to categorize alternate histories as “literature” 
or “science fiction,” a number of smaller presses have acknowledged a devoted 
audience by creating a separate alternate history or alternate universe category.21 
In addition, by the mid-nineties the novels themselves assume their readers’ 
familiarity with the idea of a literary counterfactual. As one observer noted, 
alternate histories in the seventies and eighties “tended to present the concept 
of a novelist’s changing history as itself a striking idea—which is an indication 
of how modestly the popular articles and genre fiction had penetrated general 
public awareness.”22
 Finally, one can point, if only anecdotally, to the enthusiasm of many of the 
genre’s readers. In 2002, David Dale in the Australian Sydney	Morning	Herald 
called the alternate history phenomenon not just a “growing branch of literature” 
or “controversial trend in scholarship” but a “passionate cult on the Internet.”23 
The internet has facilitated affective investment by allowing fans to connect 
to each other—and thereby register their interest publicly—not just on online 
forums or fan sites like “AlternateHistory.com” and “Timelines—This Day in 
Alternate History” but via user-created sites such as Amazon Listmania! As of 
March 2011, Amazon displayed over 800 lists with “alternate history” in their 
title.24 In addition, the minimal formal regulations of the counterfactual experi-
ment lead many readers to become writers (if unpublished) and create their own 
historical scenarios. As the alternate history has gone mainstream, the passion 
and size of its base has grown.
 While there has been little systematic analysis of the genre’s growth, several 
journalists and academics have suggested possible explanations. A number of 
reasons, such as revolutions in twentieth-century science and the influence of 
the entertainment revolution, have been debunked elsewhere.25 Aside from the 
impact of the end of the Cold War, which I will focus on, two factors deserve 
mention. The genre’s connection to postmodernism has drawn the most attention, 
but developments in book publishing have played a more significant role in its 
growth.
 The most widespread explanation for the growth of the alternate history 
is the influence of postmodernism on history and historiography.26 The salient 
features of postmodernism here are its ironic relationship to history; skepticism 
of traditional historical narratives, especially grand narratives; and privileging of 
alternative voices. For many critics, postmodernism is taken to be both a vague 
global trend as well as a historical event (a material cause, like a legislative 
act).27 In its denial of the possibility of objective knowledge of the world and its 
emphasis on the role of subjectivity and narrative in historiography, postmodern 
thinkers claim, as one historian put it, that
Fictional stories invented by writers and the narrations fash-
ioned by historians do not differ from one another in any 
essential respect because both are made out of language and 
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equally subject to the latter’s rules in the practice of rhetoric 
and the construction of narrative.28
The suggestion is that since postmodernism has knocked the historian from her 
perch, what we call history is not indistinct from literature. In postmodern histori-
ography, then, the alternate historian has the same claim to truth as the academic.
 Although this argument may hold some water in general, the mystery that 
surrounds the meaning of “postmodernism” makes it a somewhat facile and in-
controvertible explanation. More importantly, it does little to explain the growth 
of the alternate history genre. Alternate history novels may have the attributes 
of postmodern texts but they do not function as postmodern histories for their 
readers and writers. Some scholars assert that postmodern texts fundamentally 
challenge—and, indeed, alter—the popular conception of the past so as to call 
into the question the very possibility of history and truth. But as one reviewer 
observed,
The genre does nothing that historians are not doing everyday, 
but it	does	provide	a	solid	unchanging	history,	in its own way. 
The author of the alternate history sets	in	stone	the change (s)
he wishes to make in out accepted history. From that point 
on until every copy of the novel or short story vanishes, that 
particular view of history is permanent, after a fashion. From 
this perspective, alternate history appears to offer a solid stable 
ground for our history, rather than causing our foundations to 
slip away.29
Rather than provide a conflicting version of a dominant historical reading—as 
“history from below” does, for example—and thus challenge the foundation of 
historical objectivity, alternate histories tend to tell a different story in a traditional 
way. Alternate histories reinforce traditional western notions of historiographical 
objectivity even as they appear to subvert them.
 If the birth of this curious genre owes a debt to postmodernism, it is more 
to the influence of postmodernism on the literary world.30 While postmodern 
literature generally refers to formally complicated serious literature produced 
by and for cultural elites,31 major postmodern theorists such as Jean- François 
Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Frederic Jameson have argued that there is a post-
modern influence on every aspect of culture, both high and low. Popular music, 
film, television, art and the media have all been influenced by postmodernism, 
and many elite postmodern texts	have become remarkably popular.32 Whatever 
its effects on popular conceptions of history, it can certainly be argued that the 
blurring of categories, disciplines, and genres associated with postmodernism 
has paved the road for the popularity of alternate history novels. 
 Recent changes in the book publishing industry, however, have had a stronger 
and more direct role on the popularity of the alternate history genre. As Janice 
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Radway noted in her classic study of romance readers, the dedicated fans of genre 
fiction allow booksellers to predict future sales reliably, satisfying the bottom 
lines of publishers and large chain bookstores.33 Thus, the formation of genres is 
encouraged by the economic motivation of media institutions, and the alternate 
history is in some ways in a better position than other genres to benefit from the 
competitive marketplace. Gregory Feeley, a journalist and alternate historian, 
notes that,
The pressures of modern publishing have also helped, as 
alternate histories lend themselves almost uniquely well to 
what publishers call “high concept.” The central idea behind 
most alternate histories is so straightforward as to be iconic—
sometimes conveyed in the title, but often reducible to a single 
image, which publishers have been happy to employ.34
In an oversaturated market book covers are designed to advertise the book, and 
iconic alternate history book covers are unusually descriptive of their content.35 
For example, the cover of the 1997 Del Rey edition of How	Few	Remain:	A	Novel	
of	the	Second	War	Between	the	States has a confederate and an American flag 
crossed to form an X, with the title and author’s name in WANTED-poster West-
ern letters and the corners singed, promising the shoot-‘em-up military showdown 
between two regions that it eventually delivers. The cover of the 1997 Harper 
Voyager paperback Voyage has a massive American flag in the foreground and 
a small rocket shooting upward in the distance, which also heralds its patriotic 
tale of John F. Kennedy’s backing of an American trip to Mars during his second 
term. As one of the few Sidewise winners to be issued by a small publisher and 
remain relatively unpopular, Martin J. Gidron’s The	Severed	Wing	is the exception 
that highlights the rule; while its cover is arresting (due to the Nazi insignia and 
the teardrops of blood), it gives little indication of the novel’s plot.36 
The Liberation of Post-Cold War
Historical Imagination
 Contemporary true alternate histories have tackled a wide range of imagi-
native subject matter, but the Cold War has been noticeably absent. This is, in 
part, because it does not easily fit the genre’s formula: alternate historians tend to 
focus on the turning points or junctures of history, hot wars such as the American 
Civil War and World War II. While the possibility of a Soviet victory dwindled 
in western eyes during the 1980s, the continued ideological hegemony of one (if 
not both) of the dueling deterministic philosophies (Marxism and liberal capital-
ism) seemed inevitable until 1989. The Cold War paradigm continued to exert a 
powerful influence on Americans at least until the Berlin Wall actually fell. The 
cultural influence of the Cold War is often seen as limited to the hysteria of the 
1950s (bomb shelters, apocalyptic films, etc.), but recent historical scholarship is 
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challenging that perspective by linking subjects such as the American family and 
the civil rights movement to the Cold War.37 It is, of course, impossible to draw 
a firm causal link between a historical event and a shift in the consciousness of 
an entire nation of diverse classes, races, ethnicities, religions, and genders, but 
it would be myopic to ignore the connection between the end of the Cold War 
and the growth of the alternate history.
 The standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States was couched, by 
both superpowers, as an ideological battle between communism and capitalism. 
Many crucial aspects of American culture and society—such as the ideology of 
liberal capitalism and the dominance of neoclassical economics—were manipu-
lated in Manichaean opposition to their Soviet counterparts. But if the American 
way was considered the antithesis of godless communism, both ideologies were 
confidently deterministic. The Soviet Union officially endorsed Marx’s dialecti-
cal theory of history, which viewed capitalism as a necessary stage of historical 
development before communism. If Westerners were not quite as certain of the 
inevitability of their creed, their ideology was similarly teleological. The version 
of American liberal capitalism that emerged in the 1950s—a highly militarized 
welfare state founded on principles of secularism and individual liberty, governed 
by a representative democracy—was considered to be an ideal state of economic 
and social development that guaranteed timeless natural rights. While many 
citizens of the Soviet Union and its satellite states became disillusioned with 
Soviet communism, the vast majority of Americans continued to support—and 
had a deep affective investment in—what they considered the basic principles 
of the west, even if they increasingly objected to their application. 
 It would be impossible to measure the extent to which this ideological battle 
affected the consciousness of Americans over a period of four decades, but in 
many ways the post-Cold War period was more likely to produce anti-determinist 
narratives than its initial phase. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Cold War was 
not only at the core of American foreign (and sometimes domestic) policy but 
also a presence in daily life. More than a framework to interpret the world, the 
Cold War guaranteed the future; the options available were communist subver-
sion, a Soviet nuclear attack, an American victory, or a continued stalemate. As 
Alan Nadel writes in Containment	Culture, “. . . the American Cold War is a 
particularly useful example of the power of large cultural narratives to unify, 
codify, and contain—perhaps intimidate	is the best word—the personal narra-
tives of its population.”38 From the late 1950s through until the rise of détente 
in the mid 1970s, this narrative was enervated by domestic cultural and political 
movements. As the Baby Boom Generation grew into adolescence, youth culture 
and rock and roll music gave American parents something new to fear. For many 
Americans, the Civil Rights Movement replaced the threat of communism as 
the bogeyman of the decade. By the late sixties and early seventies, anti-war 
protests, Black Power, and the women’s liberation movement seemed to have a 
greater influence on domestic culture than the Soviet Union.
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 The period of détente, ranging roughly from 1972-1979, saw the normaliza-
tion of a polarized world.39 In the wake of the “world revolutions” of 1968, elites 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain sacrificed idealism for stability. As Cold War 
historian Jeremi Suri put it,
The ‘peace’ created by détente entrenched the social and po-
litical status quo. Cooperation among the great power became 
a substitute for both domestic and international reform. . . . 
Diplomatic arrangements made war less likely, but they also 
froze most of the initial sources of antagonism in place.40
In the 1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States reconciled themselves to 
accepting a world that was divided along political and ideological lines. During 
the 1950s, many Americans expected a hot war to change their world, one way or 
another. By the 1970s, with the ambitious political aspirations of the late sixties 
frustrated and a foreign policy designed to preserve the status quo, change seemed 
much less likely. After the minor flurry of Nazi-inspired allohistories published 
in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Philip K. Dick’s The	Man	in	the	High	Castle, 
comparatively few American alternate histories were published until the 1990s.
 The end of détente is attributed to increased open conflict in the Middle East 
and the election of Ronald Reagan. As historian John Lewis Gaddis put it,
[Reagan] saw that the Cold War itself had become a conven-
tion: that too many minds in too many places had resigned 
themselves to its perpetuation. He sought to break the stale-
mate—which was, he believed, largely psychological—by 
exploiting Soviet weaknesses and asserting western strengths.41
Reagan pursued this end through confrontational rhetoric, an emphasis on mili-
tary technology, and aggressive diplomacy. If, in retrospect, we see Gorbachev’s 
policies of glasnost	and perestroika	as the beginning (or sign) of the end, most 
Westerners at the time did not. The division of the world into two oppositional 
camps—even if one of them seemed to be dwindling and crumbling—had been 
normalized for almost a half-century. As a result, Gaddis noted that “the upheav-
als of 1989, like those of 1789, caught everyone by surprise.”42
 The end of the cold war had a powerful effect on authors and audiences 
alike. The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a shift in the literary 
career of the alternate history genre’s most prolific writer, master of alternate 
history Harry Turtledove, whose popularity is so great that no small portion of 
genre’s emergence and success could be placed on his shoulders alone. Turtledove 
received a PhD in Byzantine history in 1977 and immediately published his first 
novel, Wereblood, the first novel of a fantasy series set in the ancient Byzantine 
era.43 Between 1977 and 1991, Turtledove published twelve novels,44 most of 
them either fantasy or science-fiction. His first alternate history was Guns	of	
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the	South, published in 1992. While he continues to publish fantasy novels and 
short stories, Turtledove has become the face (or name) of the alternate history 
genre. He has published three separate, unrelated alternate histories of the Civil 
War.45 Despite a decade-long literary career, Turtledove did not begin to re-write 
American history until the Cold War permanently thawed.
 New possibilities emerged. For most alternate historians, the plausibility 
of the alternate timeline is of great importance. Many authors argue in the first 
person for the historical accuracy of their literary counterfactual; for them, al-
ternate histories are not so much what-if	but almost-was.	In his introduction to 
1862, Robert Conroy claims that “the possibility of England entering the war 
on the side of the Confederacy was very real”46; Michael Chabon’s The	Yiddish	
Policeman’s	Union	and Philip Roth’s	The	Plot	Against	America	both contain 
afterwords with detailed, supportive historical documentation.47 Stephen Baxter, 
in the Author’s Note accompanying Voyage:	A	Novel	of	What	Might	Have	Been,	
goes one step further.
 In 1996, we need scientists on Mars. They could have 
been there a decade ago. My novel may be the closest thing 
to a history of that lost, alternate universe ever to be written, 
and I have striven to make it as “true” as possible.
 It really would have been like this.48
Sometimes these claims of historical objectivity are matched by reviewers: Pub-
lishers	Weekly’s	review of How	Few	Remain, printed on its inside cover, praises 
Harry Turtledove for his “rigorous historiography” in a novel that portrays a 
gentlemanly conversation between Frederick Douglas and Stonewall Jackson 
behind Confederate lines. At the end of the Cold War, the plausibility of such a 
historical mutation was increased due to the loosening of the hegemonic hold of 
deterministic ideologies in the United States. The increased flexibility of retro-
active imagination is underlined by the mutation of another historical figure in 
How	Few	Remain: the proud socialist and disgraced president, Abraham Lincoln.
The Character of the Contemporary Alternate History
 The alternate history is undoubtedly a genre, but unlike the romance novel, 
the western or the thriller, the various forms the contemporary alternate history 
assumes defy easy categorization. Alternate histories have been written as spy 
thrillers and fictional autobiographies, mysteries and historical novels. A gen-
eralization, even confined to the true alternate history in the last decade and a 
half, will overlook dozens of counterexamples. Nonetheless, there are a number 
of commonalities among the majority of alternate histories, especially those that 
have become most popular, which provide a window into the broader cultural 
significance of the genre. Journalists and academics searching for the message 
of individual alternative histories have tended to investigate the surface moral 
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and ethical significance of each novel’s plot—Does	 this	 author	 condone	 the	
South	winning	the	Civil	War? How	do	they	portray	Hitler?—while missing the 
political arguments implicit in the structures and shapes of the alternate worlds 
presented in each novel. Very few commentators have subjected the alternate 
universes in this genre to the kind of political analysis that is applied to some 
science fiction, for example.49
 The two bedrock features of the alternate history are its emphasis on military 
and physical force as the prime movers of history and, counterintuitively, a deep-
seated distrust of centralized government, even extending to the military itself. 
In her essay “Genre as Social Action,” Carolyn Miller identifies three layers of 
generic elements, the “substantive, stylistic, and situation,” which she equates 
to content, form, and context. Miller sees the three in a hierarchical relationship, 
and using this framework we can articulate why many casual observers have 
not identified this genre’s structural elements. Journalists have often considered 
only the genre’s substance (the setting, characters, and plot of each novel); oth-
ers have considered the form of the alternate history and the counterfactual; but 
very few have assessed its context. While Miller uses context to describe the 
“speech-act[s]” of the alternate historians themselves, I want to extend that term 
to the context of the characters in each novel: the political, social, and cultural 
shape of the universe they inhabit. It is necessary to identify and juxtapose the 
contexts of the authors and their characters in order to understand the alternate 
history as a cultural formation.50 Under this spotlight, the alternate history reflects 
the power of libertarian thought in the contemporary United States. 
 In their selection of a point of departure, each alternate historian implicitly 
endorses a theory of historical change. With a few notable exceptions, alternate 
historians support the great man theory or the primacy of military action, if not 
both. To survey the genre as a whole I look to the Sidewise Awards. From 1995 
to 2007, 44 novels were selected as winners and runners-up of the Sidewise 
Award for Alternate History.51 Of these, 29 can be considered true alternate his-
tories.52 While this may constitute a small sample size, it is useful to highlight 
some trends that continue outside of the winner’s circle. In 24 out of the 29, the 
point of departure is either a different outcome of a military confrontation or a 
decision made by a powerful (and still well-known) individual.53
 The “great man” theory of historiography is associated with nineteenth-
century philosopher Thomas Carlyle, who claimed that “[t]he history of the 
world is but the biography of great men.”54 Today the great man theory informs 
thick biographies of presidents, scientists, and historical figures; in the twenty-
first-century American culture of celebrity (and the imperial presidency) it is 
almost common sense. Many authors, such as Turtledove and Robert Conroy, 
see famous individuals as possessing an almost superhuman will-to-power that 
destines them to rise to fame regardless of their circumstances; sections read 
like historical fiction, with long debates and confrontations between generals 
and presidents that test the boundaries of plausibility.55 For example, the point 
of departure in Gidron’s The	Severed	Wing is Theodore Roosevelt’s third term, 
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but the actress Susan Sarandon still works her way into the public’s eye—as Vice 
President of the United States.56
 The second theory endorsed by most contemporary alternate histories is that 
of military history, which claims that military battles are the most significant and 
influential historical events. They are turning points, moments of bifurcation, 
whose consequences fundamentally determine the character of the world for 
decades, centuries, or even millennia. While many alternate histories include 
detailed military battles, most of them do not. They differ from military fiction in 
that they simply mention that the point of departure, decades before the novel’s 
present, involved an alternate military outcome. Most contemporary alternate 
histories portray worlds that are dominated by the preparation for, waging of, 
and consequences of war—the two most popular themes in the genre are a Nazi 
victory in World War II and a Confederate victory in the American Civil War.
 Often, the fulcrum is both personal and	military. In How	Few	Remain, a 
tactical error by Abraham Lincoln leads to the North’s defeat in the first	Civil War. 
Brendan DuBois, in Resurrection	Day, has John F. Kennedy accidentally engage 
the Soviet Union in a nuclear war that destroys both nations. Pamela Sargent’s 
Climb	the	Wind	envisions a Native American named Touch-the-Clouds uniting 
indigenous Americans to resist militarily the United States in the decades after 
the Civil War. If these points of departure seem like natural choices, their limited 
range is brought into relief by the few alternate histories that rely on different 
points of departure, such as The	Age	of	Unreason. In this four-part series, begin-
ning with Newton’s	Cannon	in 1998, the point of departure is seventeenth-century 
science. Instead of Newtonian physics and the scientific method, the scientific 
paradigm that dominates the novel’s world is closely tied to religion, spirituality, 
and alchemy. This leads to an alternate world that is fundamentally different in 
almost every conceivable way.57
 The abuse of power and mobilization of the industrial state for nefarious 
purposes is the most glaring and perhaps universal feature of the contemporary 
alternate history novel. In the 24 novels I have identified, the military has a 
palpable presence that saturates the imaginary world but often fails to guarantee 
safety, not unlike the arms race during the cold war. If the Nazi state provides 
the referential model, the unstated goal of many alternate historians is to show 
that wholesale political corruption, if not totalitarianism itself, is always right 
around history’s corner—not only can	it happen here (usually referring to the 
West), it almost did.58 In Philip Roth’s The	Plot	Against	America, Charles Lind-
bergh defeats Franklin Delano Roosevelt to become president in 1940 and (after 
establishing an alliance with Hitler) uses the machinery of the federal government 
to murder American Jews.59 In Time	On	My	Hands, President Ronald Reagan’s 
abuses of executive power motivate a travel writer and physicist to travel back 
in time and derail his political career. In The	Yiddish	Policemen’s	Union, the 
President helps a radical Jewish sect bomb Palestine and ignite a global holy 
war so as to expedite the Christian Apocalypse. One character’s lamentations 
could summarize the conspiratorial mood of many alternate histories: “God damn 
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them all. I always knew they were there. Down there in Washington. Up there 
over our heads. Holding the strings. Setting the agenda. Of course I knew that. 
We all knew that.”60 Even outside of the novels that focus on a victorious Nazi 
Germany, the genre’s emphasis on institutional racism,61 military treachery,62 
and government censorship63 can be highlighted by a comparison with science 
fiction. Although many sci-fi writers have explored dystopian futures, the genre 
has often displayed a utopian optimism in the possibility of political, social, and 
technological progress enabled by a massive (even global) centralized govern-
ment.64 Most contemporary alternate histories, on the other hand, have viewed 
big government as a threat with few benefits.
 With these thoughts in mind, I want to look in depth at one representative 
novel: Brendan DuBois’ Resurrection	Day. It won the Sidewise Award in 1999 
and makes explicit themes that are implicit and assumed in many alternate his-
tories. Resurrection	Day is set in 1972, ten years after a global nuclear war that 
followed the Cuban missile crisis, the novel’s point of departure. America’s large 
cities, infrastructure, military, and civilian leadership were devastated by Soviet 
bombs, while America’s nuclear weapons destroyed the Soviet Union. The twin 
plot lines of the novel surround the missile crisis and the military. The accepted 
history of the missile crisis blames President Kennedy for recklessness, but 
Resurrection	Day’s	protagonist, Carl Landry, discovers that a top army official 
(a General Curtis) actually ordered the strike on Cuba. In the ensuing decade, 
Curtis has maintained a military dictatorship by repressing political resistance 
and censoring the press.
 Landry is at the center of Resurrection	Day.	Within the novel he functions 
as a reporter, but his military history often foregrounds the action. As a “god-
damn quota baby” rewarded for his post-nuclear service, Landry holds a job for 
which he is unqualified.65 The barbs he receives from his colleagues speak to the 
wall between soldiers and civilians in the novel, which reflects the experience 
of American soldiers after the Vietnam war and the political division between 
hawkish conservatives and somewhat less militaristic Democrats. At the same 
time, as the narrator repeats time and time again, Landry’s survival in the face 
of a government conspiracy to assassinate him is due to his background in the 
armed services. He calls on the mental, physical, and technological skills that he 
learned during military training and service to protect himself from the govern-
ment that trained him—a fitting metaphor for the ideological contradictions of 
the genre itself. For example, as he hides from army snipers,
Carl emptied one of the two satchels into his knapsack and 
fastened the blankets to the pack. He pulled out his holstered 
Colt .45, unbuckled his belt, and slipped the holster onto it. 
Sandy stared at him, and then the weapon.
 “Where did you get that?”
 “From	my	years	of	service	to	this	country,	that’s	where.66
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The dedication to this paradoxical position is apparent in DuBois’ inability to 
imagine a radically different alternative to his dystopia. In his search for the 
historical record of Kennedy’s valor, Landry makes his way through the under-
ground world of officially abandoned post-nuclear New York City. But instead 
of a pacifist, egalitarian community, might-makes-right even in this romanticized 
resistance and power is just as centralized below as it is above. As such, the leader 
of the PS 19 gang and the mayor of underground New York is seen as a king:
It was like young royalty, he thought, moving among his 
people. They went into a dark part of the subway station, past 
another barricade where a couple of young men were sitting, 
holding what looked like police revolvers in their hands.67
The culture of these revolutionaries imitates the militarism, hierarchal organiza-
tion and conflicted commitments of the world above.
 The unspoken tension between the lionization of the military and a distrust 
of centralized government that is at the heart of Resurrection	Day	and many con-
temporary alternate histories should be viewed in light of similar tensions within 
American conservatism. The politics of a genre as diverse as the alternate history 
are not immediately apparent in the arena of ethics or values, what Miller calls 
the “substance” of each novel. By situating the contemporary alternate history 
within the historical context of its production and consumption, the ideological 
commitments that inform the genre become clear: a libertarian distrust of “big 
government” on one hand and a dedicated militarism on the other. As the alternate 
history took shape in the mid-1990s, it reflected the political philosophy that had 
been re-calibrating the American political landscape for over a decade. 
The Growth of Libertarianism in the United States
 Modern conservatism emerged on the national stage with the election of Ron-
ald Reagan in 1980 after two decades of gestation. The conservative movement 
has been covered extensively by historians in recent years, but its relevance to 
my subject requires a brief summary here.68 The growth of the right was initially 
the result of a widespread backlash against the liberalism of the 1960s, but it 
developed through decades of grassroots conservative organizing. The pillars 
of the ideology that emerged were “an antistatist libertarianism and a norma-
tive conservatism” that found an increasingly receptive audience in the 1970s, 
especially among whites and suburbanites.69 Social conservatism was tied to a 
perceived moral permissiveness in the wake of the Vietnam War and the various 
political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which provoked a renewed desire 
for traditional family values; the libertarian element was the result of extreme 
ideological polarization encouraged during the Cold War. With the Soviet Union 
in mind, many Americans saw the muscular liberal state that emerged in the 
1960s—Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, federal legal protection against race 
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and gender discrimination, and above all the welfare state—as an encroachment 
on personal liberty. In this sense libertarianism drew on the traditional American 
mythology of western, rugged individualism.
 Ronald Reagan wedded conservative and libertarian ideas to a patriotic 
populism. Reagan’s passionate rhetoric against big government, taxation, and the 
welfare state effected a lasting influence on American politics by moving social 
conservatism and libertarianism into the mainstream. Even after Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush were out of office, the power of libertarian ideas remained. 
The Wall	Street	Journal	noted in 1995 that,
Because of their growing disdain for government, more and 
more Americans appear to be drifting—often unwittingly—
toward a libertarian philosophy. That seems particularly true 
among baby boomers returning to the “do your own thing” 
ethos of their youth and among young people involved in the 
intensely independent computer industry. Indeed, when the 
Gallup polling organization last year asked questions about 
government’s role that were designed to distill Americans’ 
political philosophies, it categorized 22% of the public as 
“libertarian.”70
In his 1996 State of the Union address, Bill Clinton acknowledged the continuing 
popularity of antistatism by claiming that “The era of big government is over.”71
 The meteoric rise of alternate historian Newt Gingrich checked the liberal (if 
not leftist) tendencies of the Clintons, and briefly led observers to believe that a 
more overt form of libertarianism might emerge. In 1995 USA	Today	announced 
(with some hyperbole) that “what liberalism was to the ‘60s and conservatism 
was to the ‘80s, libertarianism may be to the youth of ‘90s.”72 In 1994 Gingrich, 
along with other Republican congressmen, published Contract	With	America, 
with its emphasis on tax cuts and welfare reform. That November, Republicans 
gained 54 seats in house elections; Gingrich became the first Republican speaker 
in 40 years, and in 1995 Time	named him their Man of the Year.73
 At the same time as Americans were pushing for less government, they 
were investing more money and faith in the military. The depth of the “new 
American militarism,” as historian Andrew Bacevich has called the phenom-
enon, goes far beyond military expenditures.74 In the wake of the Vietnam War 
and the resulting national distrust of the armed forces, Reagan set out to restore 
military confidence by mythologizing the American soldier and constructing the 
military as a weathervane of national strength. The symbolic manipulation was, 
in part, the groundwork for actual increases in defense spending (which doubled 
during Reagan’s presidency75), but it had cultural effects that lingered until very 
recently. After the apparent success of the Gulf War, military expenditures and 
the deification of the armed forces only increased, as Democrats such as Bill 
Clinton found it politically suicidal to question the new American militarism. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, opinion polls surveying public attitudes toward 
national institutions have regularly ranked the armed services first.76 While 
confidence in the executive branch, the congress, the media, and even organized 
religion has waned, confidence in the military continues to climb, as reflected in 
the majority of alternate histories.77 Even apart from Turtledove-style novels that 
could double as military fiction,78 many alternate histories see military battles as 
history’s turning points. Perhaps diplomacy does not sell.
 The apparent contradiction between a libertarian distrust of big government 
and an embrace of the armed forces that represent that government is a cogni-
tive dissonance that did not troubled modern American conservatism until the 
mid-2000s, when the alliance between economic and religious conservatives 
that elected and re-elected George W. Bush unravelled. In the reality of facts 
and figures, this equation has created massive debt for the United States; in the 
world of popular culture, the result is a character like Resurrection	Day’s	Carl 
Landry, who owes his survival to his military training as he is hunted by his own 
government.
Conclusion
 To suggest a link between alternate history novels and conservative poli-
tics is not to claim that Turtledove, Conroy and Roth are dedicated libertarians 
who use their fiction as an ideological tool. In fact, there is a wing of science 
fiction which is explicitly libertarian. In 1980, L. Neil Smith, the founder of 
the Prometheus Award for Best Libertarian Fiction, published The	Probability	
Broach, a plural uchronia where a single altered word in the preamble to the 
Declaration of Independence leads to a revolt during the Whiskey Rebellion and 
the execution of George Washington. Two hundred years later, the United States 
is a libertarian paradise without a functional central government; men, women, 
and even children arm and defend themselves. The subtler libertarian coloring 
of the alternate history does reflect the politics of its authors, though in a less 
deliberate and direct way.
 Alternate histories have often been seen as thought experiments, with each 
author a scientist who spins the wheel of chance without bias or partisanship. But, 
to run with this metaphor, each novel betrays the wheel’s tilt and its direction. 
That most alternate history novels are considered apolitical reflects the extent 
to which the principles of libertarianism have oriented the naturalized, national 
political paradigm. In the spirit of the alternate history, one might ask, What	if	
the	genre	had	existed	twenty	years	ago?	How	would	the	worlds	of	these	novels	
differ?	Psychologists who have studied the mechanics of counterfactual thinking 
have noted that counterfactuals tend to betray the limits of imagination:
[T]he likelihood of a person’s mentally mutating salient events, 
exceptions, and actions is a function of the ease with which 
these events come or are brought to mind, relative to other 
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events…That is, if it is difficult for one to imagine alternatives 
to an event, that event will not be mentally mutated.79
From this perspective, we can see the alternate history genre not as a marginal 
subculture that appeals only to science fiction geeks and libertarians, but an 
unconscious cultural reflection of the political zeitgeist	of mid-1990s America. 
One way to test this hypothesis is to search for anti-libertarian alternate histories, 
where centralized government is viewed in a positive, optimistic or even utopian 
light. Of the 29 novels in my sample, only two, Disturbance	Of	Fate	and Voy-
age, are in the ballpark.80 A deeper detour into the various ways that alternate 
histories could	be written would only further de-naturalize the genre’s character. 
 Future research on alternate history novels should focus on their producers 
and the meanings created in their consumption. Who are these alternate historians? 
34 individuals have won the Sidewise Award or received an honorable mention.81 
Of these, 28 are men, 6 are women; 24 are American and 10 are European; every 
novelist to receive an award or honorable mention appears to be (what according 
to the dominant contemporary American racial formation would be characterized 
as) racially white. The connection between the worlds created by this overwhelm-
ingly white, male group can be contrasted with the few black authors who have 
written in this genre. African American author Steven Barnes, for example, has 
published two books in an alternate history series, Lion’s	Blood	and Zulu	Heart, 
in which America was colonized by Islamic Africans from Egypt. In his alternate 
America, “Bilalistan,” racial hierarchies are reversed, with Africans and Arabs 
in positions of power while European slaves are used for manual labor.82 The 
connection between Barnes’ race, gender, and nationality and his fictive world 
has been widely noted,83 but the role that the same factors play for white, male, 
American writers who compose the majority of alternate histories is ignored.
 Audience research would be extremely useful to understand how readers 
make sense of the genre and how it influences them. As Edward Schiappa argues 
in Beyond	Representational	Correctness, in her reception of a text each individual 
creates a “phenomenal text” which is “the text as its various readers perceive 
and experience it.”84 In this paper I have focused on the texts themselves, with 
the understanding that alternate histories are made to “mean” something new by 
each reader. The profile of the alternate history reader has not been studied to 
date. Further research on this subject will hopefully take into account not only 
the socioeconomic status of writers and	readers but also the relationship between 
the two. The role of this genre in performing the cultural and ideological work 
of influencing readers is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
contemporary alternate history’s ability to encode dominant political positions 
within a marginal genre of popular fiction certainly leaves that possibility open. 
 Viewed in its historical context, the alternate history is far from the apolitical 
literary exercise in historical contingency that it appears to be. Its emergence 
can be tied to specific historical and political circumstances, and the shape of 
its internal worlds—which readers are invited to perceive as likely alternatives 
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to actual historical development—should be seen in as a reflection of the influ-
ence of libertarianism on contemporary American political thought. The genre’s 
longevity and popularity will ultimately depend on a host of factors, but one 
of them is undoubtedly its reaction to changes in the American political and 
social climate, since the generic conventions that shape literary consumption 
are best understood as constantly in flux, “undercurrent[s] of history rather than 
. . . isolated in time.” The alternate history novel and various manifestations of 
counterfactual thought present an interesting opportunity for future research, 
especially as the United States undergoes what appears to be significant political 
changes. As I have argued by viewing the rise of the genre in the context of the 
cold war, the alternate history is not just, as some critics argue, about re-writing 
history, but a test of the limits of historical imagination. If indeed there has been 
or will be an expansion in the popular or national imagination of what is possible, 
counterfactual literature may serve as one canary in the coal mine.
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